I studied economics at HU Berlin, University of Copenhagen and Leuphana University. In fall 2018, I was visiting the Center for Experimental Social Sciences at New York University.
Social Image Concerns and Welfare Take-Up with Jana Friedrichsen and Tobias König,
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 168, 2018, pp. 174-192. (Link)
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually benecial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of “taxpayers” vote for the public transfer.
Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Gothenburg*
VfS Annual Congress, Vienna*
Lindau Meeting Of The Laureates Of The Sveriges Riksbank, Lindau*
European Economic Association - Annual Congress, Lisbon
Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium, Maastricht*
ZEW Public Finance Conference, Mannheim*
International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences (IMEBESS), Barcelona
"Arne Ryde Workshop on Identity, Image and Economic Behavior, Image", Lund*
Economic Science Association - European Meeting, Bergen
Micro Reading Group, Berlin
(* presented by coauthor)
Do prices and purchases respond similarly to soft drink tax increases and cuts?
with Sinne Smed,
Economics and Human Biology, Vol. 37, 2020, 100864. (Link)
While in January 2012, Denmark increased the long-standing tax on sugary soft drinks, the tax was cut by half in July 2013 and then completely repealed in January 2014. In this study, we examine whether increases and cuts of the soft drink tax lead to symmetric over- or under-shifting to prices and to symmetric demand responses. We use longitudinal scanner data of 1,282 Danish households to estimate within-product changes in prices and within-household changes in purchase quantity. The tax hike was overshifted by a factor of 2.2 while the tax repeal was passed through with a factor of 1.2. On average, consumption was 13.4 percent lower the year after the tax increase compared to the year before. The repeal of the tax was associated with an increase in purchase quantity of 31.0 percent. This is equivalent to price elasticities of 1.1 and 1.3 respectively. The results suggest that consumers react stronger to tax cuts than to tax increases. Furthermore, the increase in consumption following a tax cut has no limiting effect on the consumption of other beverages suggesting an increase in the intake of calories. This might have implications for health in countries that consider repealing current taxes on soft drinks.
Sin Taxes and Self Control
with Sinne Smed, November 2019. (PDF)
"Sin taxes" can be welfare improving if they help people with low self-control reduce their consumption of unhealthy goods. A number of theoretical papers show that this requires consumers with low self-control to respond at least as strongly to a tax as people with high self-control. In this paper, we investigate this relationship in the context of two sets of sin tax reforms in Denmark: first, the increase of the soft drink tax in 2012 and its repeal in 2014, and, second, the fat tax introduction in 2011 and its repeal in 2013. We assess the consumption response empirically using the GfK Consumerscan household panel. With this data, we can separate the sample in consumers with low and high levels of self-control using a survey measure. We find that consumers with low self-control reduce consumption less strongly than consumers with high self-control when taxes go up, but increase consumption to a similar extent when taxes go down. Hence, we document an asymmetry in the responsiveness to increasing and decreasing prices. We show theoretically that these observations are consistent with a model of self-control and rational habit formation. The results suggest that price instruments may not be an effective tool for targeting self-control problems.
Bridges Seminar, University of Warwick
MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich
University of Essex
Risky Health Behaviors Workshop, Hamburg
CEBI at University of Copenhagen
FAIR at NHH, Bergen
Linnaeus University, Växjö
European Economic Association - Annual Congress, Manchester
International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) - Annual Congress, Glasgow
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Applied Micro Workshop, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin
Retreat of the CRC TRR 190 "Rationality and Competition", Schwanenwerder
Food and Health Economics Workshop, Toulouse
DIW GC Summer Workshop, Potsdam
DIW Cluster Seminar, Berlin
Behavioral Welfare Economics Workshop, Berlin
IFRO Behavioral Economics Seminar, Copenhagen
Protecting the Ego: Motivated Information Selection and Updating
with Alessandro Castagnetti, December 2019. (PDF)
This paper investigates how individuals search for ego-relevant information and how they subsequently update their beliefs. In a lab experiment, participants are ranked according to either their performance in an IQ test (ego-relevant treatment) or a random number (control treatment). Subjects are incentivized to report their beliefs about whether their IQ score or their random number is in the top half of the distribution. We ask for both prior and posterior beliefs after three rounds of signals. Before the updating stage, subjects choose between information sources that vary in terms of informativeness, skewness and framing. Moreover, in a further treatment we exogenously assign subjects an information structure to investigate their updating behavior absent selection. Our results show, first, that subjects are significantly more likely to choose information structures that are less informative and positively framed if the rank is based on the ego-relevant task. Second, we find that subjects in the ego-relevant treatment update less to negative feedback but only when feedback is positively framed, i.e., when it is easier to misperceive the negative feedback. Taken together, we document that, in the IQ treatment, subjects choose information structures that allow them to selectively underweigh negative feedback. Thus, we provide evidence of a novel mechanism that explains how individuals can maintain self-serving beliefs.
University of Vienna
Bogota Experimental Economics Conference*
Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Kiel*
Economic Science Association - European Meeting, Dijon*
Dr@w Forum, Warwick University*
Warwick PhD Conference*
DIW Micro Reading Group, Berlin
(* presented by coauthor)
Fair Procedures with Naive Agents: Who Wants the Boston Mechanism?
with Tobias König, Dorothea Kübler and Lydia Mechtenberg, December 2019.
CRC TRR 190 Discussion Paper No. 222, December 2019. (PDF)
We study preferences over procedures in the presence of naive agents. We employ a school choice setting following Pathak and Sönmez (2008) who show that sophisticated agents are better off under the Boston mechanism than under a strategy-proof mechanism if some agents are sincere. We use lab experiments to study the preferences of subjects for the Boston mechanism or the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil of ignorance and spectators. As predicted, stakeholders vote for the Boston mechanism if it maximizes their payoffs and vote for the asssortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008). Subjects behind the veil of ignorance mainly choose the Boston mechanism when the priority at schools is determined randomly. In a second experiment with priorities based on performance in a real-effort task, spectators whose payoff does not depend on the choice of the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators' statements in the post-experimental questionnaire, the main reason for preferring the Boston mechanism is that playing the game well deserves a higher payoff. These findings provide a novel explanation for the widespread use of the Boston mechanism.
Earn More Tomorrow: Overconfident Income Expectations and Consumer Indebtedness
with Antonia Grohmann, Lukas Menkhoff and Christoph Merkle,
CRC TRR 190 Discussion Paper No. 152, April 2019. (PDF)
This paper examines whether biased income expectations due to overconfidence lead to higher levels of debt-taking. In a lab experiment, participants can purchase goods by borrowing against their future income. We exogenously manipulate income expectations by letting income depend on relative performance in hard and easy quiz tasks. We successfully generate biased income expectations and show that participants with higher income expectations initially borrow more. Overconfident participants scale back their consumption after feedback. However, at the end of the experiment they remain with higher debt levels, which represent real financial losses. To assess the external validity, we find further evidence for the link between overcondence and borrowing behavior in a representative survey (GSOEP-IS).
Soft Drink Taxation and Demand Persistence
(CE)² Workshop, Warsaw
DIW GC Summer Workshop, Potsdam
Zuckersteuern können zu einer gesünderen Ernährung beitragen: Kommentar, DIW Wochenbericht 12/2020, March 2020. (Link)
Wie sinnvoll ist eine Zuckersteuer? Gastbeitrag, Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland, 14.03.2020. (Link)
Softdrinksteuer: Proportionale Steuer ist der vielversprechendste Ansatz, DIW Aktuell 10, May 2018. (Link)
Eine Softdrinksteuer zur fiskalischen Konsumsteuerung, DIW Roundup 103, November 2016. (Link)